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NOTICE AND THE "DEEDS OUT" PROBLEM 
William E. Ryckman, Jr.• 
I. THE PROBLEM 
'l "'I ]'HEN a grantor conveys land which has been subjected _to ease.-
VV ments or equitable servitudes in favor. of adjacent land pre-
viously conveyed by the grantor, there arises the serious question 
whether such interests are enforceable if the purchaser has not 
expressly taken the land subject to them. A cursory inspection of 
primary and secondary authority on the subject of easements and 
equitable servitudes would indicate that the answer depends upo~ 
whether, at the time of the sale, the purchaser of the "servient estate" 
has "notice" of the "burden" to which his land is allegedly sub-
jected. It is the purpose of this article to determine the significance 
of notice in these circumstances and to ascertain when the foregoing 
test should be applied. 
The problem appears worthy of attention because the fact pat~ 
tern giving rise to disputes in this area is a recurring one. Thousands 
of new subdivisions have been developed in recent years with many 
more yet to come. In almost every case it will be deemed desirable, 
or even necessary, to impose easements and equitable servitudes for 
the benefit of the landowners in the subdivision enforceable inter 
se. Although there are ways, to be discussed below, in which the 
problem may be avoided, none is entirely satisfact~ry from the point 
of view of all parties concerned, and the frequency :with which• ques-
tions concerning easements and servitudes have given rise to litiga-
tion reinforces the suspicion that there is no simple panacea. 
Several rather uncomplicated generalizations have often been 
employed in this area. A typical e~ample is the "majority" rule 
stated in a frequently cited annotation: 
The weight of authority is to the effect that if a deed or contract 
for the conveyance of one parcel of land, with a covenant or 
easement affecting another parcel of land owned by the same 
grantor, is duly recorded, the record is constructive notice to a 
subsequent purchaser of the latter parcel. The rule is based 
generally upon the principle that a grantee is chargeable· with 
notice of everything affecting his title which could be discovered 
by an examination of the records of the deeds or other muni-
ments of title of the grantor.1 
• Associate Professor of Law, Boston University.-Ed. 
1. Annot., 16 A.L.R. 1013 (1922). See generally 4 AMERICAN I.Aw OF PROPERTY 
§ 17.24 (Casner ed. 1952); 5 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 1266 (3d ed. 1939). 
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Such a statement, by its very terms, fails to distinguish between 
cases involving covenants and cases involving easements, thus ignor-
ing the quite different theoretical and policy considerations in these 
two situations. This oversight is particularly significant with respect 
to the function of notice in such cases. Furthermore, it is doubtful 
whether all restrictive covenant cases can or should be assimilated 
under the same rule. In a case involving an express covenant arising 
out of an isolated transaction, the concept of notice may be relevant 
for reasons quite unconnected with its function in a case involving 
"reciprocal negative covenants." To compound the difficulty, the 
theory under which restrictive covenants or equitable servitudes are 
enforced is itself the subject of much dispute, and the rationale for 
requiring notice differs depending upon which theory is adopted. 
Even a brief survey of the cases supports the conclusion that the 
courts cannot deal with such problems on the basis of simple ma-
jority and minority rules. This suggests a second reason why the 
problem of notice in this context is worthy of study. When a single 
generalization is called upon to resolve a number of complex legal 
problems where the competing interests are not always the same, it 
is inevitable that courts will place limits on the applicability of the 
generalization or will carve out appropriate exceptions. Another 
method of rendering such a generalization more flexible is to re-
define substantially certain terminology of the rule. Observing such 
a process is intrinsically interesting, and may provide insight for the 
lawyer who practices in the area of land use, as well as for those who 
find fascination in what Holmes has called "the path of the law." 
Although the specific fact situations differ greatly in the cases 
under consideration, a fairly definite pattern does emerge. The 
grantor sells tract A to grantee A, making certain promises, either in 
the form of restrictive covenants or easements, purporting to burden 
tract B, which the grantor retains. Such promises may be incorpo-
rated in the deed to tract A, may be oral, may be implied from the 
circumstances of the transfer, may be noted on a recorded plat, or 
may be contained in a separate written instrument. Grantee A 
records his deed. Then, without referring in the deed to the ease-
ments or covenants to which tract B was previously subjected, the 
grantor conveys tract B to grantee B, and B records. 
Consideration and resolution of the problems created by the 
foregoing transactions must be approached from several aspects. 
First, an attempt will be made to trace the source of the rule or rules 
by which grantee B may be held to have taken tract B free of the 
interest claimed by the owner of tract A, with particular emphasis 
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on the impatt of recording statutes on this situation. Second, the case 
law in this area will be discussed in terms of the various types of in-
terests which might be claimed by the owner of tract A-express 
covenants, implied covenants, reciprocal negative covenants, express 
easements, easements by implication, easements by necessity, and 
easements by prescription. Third, an attempt will be made to eval-
uate the case law in light of the author's thesis that the traditional 
textbook generalizations have at best been too broad to be enlight-
ening, and at worst have tended to prevent the courts from dealing 
adequately with the difficult theoretical and practical problems 
which they .face in this area. 
II. THE ROLE OF THE RECORDING STATUTES 
A. Legislative Objectives 
When one attempts to evaluate the impact of the recording stat-
utes on the rights of purchasers of land burdened by easements or 
equitable servitudes, it is obviously relevant to consider the objec-
tives that such legislation seeks to achieve. Philbrick, in his exten-
sive treatment of this subject, explored the history of recording acts, 
pointing out that "recording was originally and primarily designed 
to force deeds upon the record as a substitute for the publicital ele-
ment of feoffment, undoubtedly in order to guard against dangers to 
which that ancient mode of conveyancing was subject in lesser mea-
sure than were the deeds ~at displaced it."2 Specifically, the danger . 
presented by the change in modes of conveyancing was that a pro-
spective purchaser might be defeated by a prior conveyance of a legal 
in'.terest of which he had no knowledge.3 No such danger usually 
existed under the feoffment system, which required livery of seizin, 
since the dispossessed owner would be required to regain possession 
before he could make a second conveyance.4 
The impetus for purchasers to comply with recording statutes is 
provided by the fact that the acts give a landowner power, under 
certain circumstances, to convey a valid title by virtue of a deed 
second in time.5 Typical of the early enactments in this country is 
2. Philbrick, Limits of Record Search and Therefore of Notice, 93 U. PA. L. REv. 
125, 137 (1944). 
3. The common-law rule with respect to competing legal interests is that first in 
time is first in right. See gen~rally 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 17.1 (Casner ed. 
1952). 
4. Thus, a fraudulent second conveyance was only possible where the first grantee 
was not in actual possession and did not oversee his holdings. 
5. It does not necessarily follow from the requirement of recording that a grantor 
who has made a prior conveyance has the power to confer title on a subsequent 
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the Massachusetts statute of 1640 which declared that no conveyance 
should "be of force against any other person except the graunter and 
his heirs," unless it was recorded.6 The process of judicial decision 
by which "any other person except the graunter and his heirs" came 
to be interpreted to mean a subsequent bona fide purchaser is not 
entirely clear.7 Nevertheless, by the beginning of the nineteenth cen-
tury several of the statutes had been changed to accord with this in-
terpretation, and today this change has been accomplished in almost 
every state.8 These laws provide in substance that all conveyances of 
real· estate shall be void as against subsequent purchasers in good 
faith without notice, unless the conveyances are recorded in the reg-
istry of deeds for the county where the land lies.0 The effect of such 
legislation is to protect subsequent purchasers of a legal interest,10 
and, conversely, to protect those who succeed to the rights of the 
prior grantee who has recorded.11 Furthermore, the existence of the 
record, independent of the statutory sanction for failure to record, 
serves to give constructive notice to subsequent purchasers who 
might othenvise come within the scope of the traditional equity rule 
that a subsequent purchaser of a legal interest, for value and with-
out notice, is protected against prior equities.12 
grantee. "A provision that a deed shall be recorded, is not in terms or by necessary 
implication, a provision that compliance with the statute shall render the instrument 
more efficacious than it would have been at common law." American Notes by Howe 
& Wallace to 2 WHITE & TUDOR, LEADING CASES IN EQUITY 202 (4th Am. ed. 1877). 
Philbrick suggests that the transition from feoffment to recording subjected the pur-
chaser to a second danger: "the future danger of being himself divested of title in 
favor of a purchaser subsequent to himself.'' Philbrick, supra note 2, at 138, It would 
appear more logical, however, to treat this second danger as only a by-product of the 
attempt to prevent the first. Certainly under the traditional first-in-time rule no such 
danger existed. See note 3 supra. The paradoxical result is that the purchaser, "in 
order to be protected from prior conveyances by deed, is exposed to the new danger 
of being defeated by conveyances by deed subsequent to his own. 
6. PATTON, I.AND TITLES § 8 n.95 (2d ed. 1957). 
7. For a scholarly study of the early history of such legislation, sec Philbrick, supra 
note 2, at 139-45. 
8. There are excellent compilations to be found in 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PnoPERTY 
§ 17.5 (Casner ed. 1952); PATTON, op. cit. supra note 6, ch. 12. 
9. This statement, of course, is not accurate with respect to a so-called "pure race" 
type of statute. E.g., N.C. CODE §§ 47-18, -20 (1943). 
10. The protection thus afforded abrogates the common-law rule as to conflicts 
between legal interests. See note 3 supra; 4 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY §§ 17,1-.3, 17.6 
(Casner ed. 1952). 
11. This protection has been referred to as one of the primary purposes of the 
recording Jaws. See American Notes by Howe & Wallace to 2 WHITE & Tunon, op. cit. 
supra note 5, at 203. 
12. "By this ••• doctrine, the constructive notice given by a registration stands on 
exactly the same footing, produces the same effect, and is of the same nature as any 
other species of absolute constructive notice recognized by equity •• , .'' 2 POMEROY, 
EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 665, at 886 (5th ed. 1941). See 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY 
§ 17.1 (Casner ed. 1952). 
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The point of the foregoing discussion is to avoid confusing the 
legal effects of such legislation with the concept of legislative pur-
pose. For example, the purpose of the Statute of Uses was not to 
create a new method of land transfer in England, but that was cer-
tainly its effect. Similarly, it would appear dangerous to interpret 
judicial decisions spelling out the legal effect of the recording system 
as constituting a ratio legis which may then be used in applying 
such legislation to other types of cases. It is submitted that the great 
divergence of opinion with respect to the fundamental purpose of 
the recording statutes may be attributed to a failure to make this 
distinction.13 Fundamentally, most "recording acts" may be broken 
down into two Earts: sections which establish the machinery for re-
cording, and sections dealing with the effect of recording or failure 
to record.14 The latter sections, by imposing sanctions for failure to 
record, undoubtedly have the effect of coercing recordation of the 
various documents covered by the former sections, and it can be 
persuasively argued that such was their primary purpose, if not al-
ways their ultimate effect. 
B. The Fundamental Defect zn the Recording Acts 
What emerges from such an analysis is not particularly comfort-
ing to those who would articulate a ratio legis by which to decide 
cases. Philbrick, for instance, suggests that our problems will largely 
be resolved if we regard promotion of recording as the primary pol-
icy of the recording statutes.15 We do this, he contends, by favoring 
the subsequent purchaser at the expense of the non-recording prior 
grantee. He objects strenuously to the subversion of this objective 
which results from deciding cases according to "the equities of the 
transaction," thus favoring (in certain circumstances) a non-record-
ing prior grantee over a subsequent recording grantee by treating 
the recording statutes as merely an extension of the equitable doc-
trine of notice. He considers it unfortunate that the principle of no-
tice was ever injected into the recording system, and would there-
fore limit its application by having the courts impose a rule "that 
13. Philbrick lists seven different "purposes" which have been offered by various 
writers who have concerned themselves with the problem: securing a prompt recorda-
tion, protecting subsequent purchasers, preserving an accessible history of each title, 
protecting those who might succeed to the rights of the recording grantee, saving 
from improvident investments those subsequent purchasers who search the record, 
saving from loss a subsequent purchaser who either searches the record or makes due 
investigation when put upon inquiry, and providing constructive notice. Philbrick, 
supra note 2, at 146. 
14. Cf. 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 17.7 (Casner ed. 1952). 
15. See Philbrick, supra note 2, at 149. 
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such purchaser should not be defeated by a doctrine of notice that is 
unreasonable in the burden it puts ... [upon the purchaser] either 
as respects the requirement of an unreasonable search of the record, 
or as respects the nature or the extent of the inquiry to be made."16 
Aside from the circular nature of this reasoning, the objection 
to such an approach for our purposes is that it fails to take into ac-
count situations where the prior grantee has in fact recorded.17 In-
deed, this is the crucial point so often overlooked by the cases and 
the commentators. In the vast majority of cases dealt with in this 
article, the first grantee has recorded the deed which created the dis-
puted easements or restrictive covenants at the same time that it cre-
ated in him an independent tenement. 
There are two bases upon which one might argue in favor of 
recognizing the claim of a prior grantee who has recorded his deed. 
First, there is the technical argument that in the case of easements 
the language of the recording statute permits a departure from the 
first-in-time rule only when the first grantee has not recorded.18 Sec-
ond, as a matter of policy it is obvious that any theory which favors 
subsequent purchasers will defeat the objective of encouraging re-
cording, since we have assumed that the first grantee has complied 
with the recording laws to the extent possible. The dilemma in such 
a case is fundamental. The machinery of recording as it now exists 
is not designed to cope with this situation, with the result that re-
cording is an unsatisfactory "substitute for the publicital element of 
feoffment." Under either a grantor-grantee or a tract index, it is un-
likely that grantee B, by virtue of the record, will actually be aware 
of the existence of easements or restrictions created in the deed to 
grantee A, unless B is required to examine all deeds given by his 
grantor during the time the grantor had title to tract B. Many 
courts have regarded such a "deeds out" requirement as "unreason-
able," with the consequence that the decision in each case turns on 
the court's view of the functions of notice. On the other hand, courts 
must also be concerned with protecting the reasonable expectations 
of grantee A, who has made an honest attempt to comply fully with 
16. Id. at 155. 
17. Philbrick does suggest. that in order to implement his approach the "courts 
should constantly and consistently put the burden of proving notice on the prior 
grantee, both in inquiry notice and in doubtful cases of record notice." Ibid. It would 
seem, however, that the typical situation with which we are dealing should not be 
regarded as involving a "doubtful case of record notice," since notice should be legally 
irrelevant once the prior grantee has recorded. To treat it otherwise is to commit the 
very error to which Philbrick objects: "an exaltation of the element of notice over 
recording policy." Ibid. 
18. See note 98 infra and accompanying text. 
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the law by recording his deed to tract A. Let us examine the cases 
to determine how the courts have resolved this conflict with respect 
to the various types of interest involved. 
Ill. EQUITABLE. SERVITUDES 
A. Theories of Enforcement 
In the majority of cases in this area, the subject of the dispute 
was a restrictive covenant or a so-called "equitable servitude.''19 A 
court's view of the function of notice in such cases may vary consid-
erably, depending upon which theory of enforcement of equitable 
servitudes is adopted. For instance, under the unjust-enrichment 
theory suggested in the leading case of Tulk v. Moxhay20 and devel-
oped by Ames,21 there can be no unjust enrichment if the parties 
bargained for the land with knowledge of the burden of the restric-
tion, since it is their unrealized expectations which form the basis 
of the unjust enrichment.22 Several writers have developed.a contract 
theory for the enforcement of equitable servitudes. Under this con-
cept, equity will impose a duty upon all third persons with notice 
to refrain from conduct which might deprive the promisee of the 
equitable right to specific performance of his contract.23 Although 
the point is seldom discussed, presumably under this theory the 
right to specific performance exists as against any possessor who takes 
the land with notice of the burden, whether or not he is a purchaser 
for value.24 
Perhaps che most widely accepted theory, developed by Pound25 
and Clark,26 is that equity treats the restrictive covenant as an equi-
table interest in land analogous to an easement. In other words, the 
19. Although there has been considerable dispute over the appropriate terminology 
to be applied to this type of burden, some authorities preferring the term "negative 
easements" or "rights in the nature of easements," the term "equitable servitudes" 
advocated by Pound seems most appropriate and will hereafter be used in this article. 
See Pound, Progress of the Law, 1918-1919: Equity, 33 HARV. L. R.Ev. 813 (1919). 
20. 2 Ph. 774, 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (Ch. 1848). 
21. Ames, Spedfit Performance For and Against Strangers, 17 HARv. L. R.Ev. 174 
(1903). 
22. For a refutation of the unjust enrichment theory, see Clark, Equitable Servi-
tudes, 16 MICH. L. R.Ev. 90, 91 (1917). 
23. See Stone, The 'Equitable Rights and Liabilities of Strangers to a Contract, 18 
CoLuM. L. R.Ev. 291 (1918). The contract rights of the promisee are treated as im-
pliedly assigned to subsequent purchasers of the benefited land. See also Stone, The 
Equitable Rights and Liabilities of .Strangers to a Contract, 19 CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 177 
(1919). 
24. See Reno, The Enforcement of Equitable Servitudes in Land, 28 VA. L. R.Ev. 
951, 974 (1942). 
25. See Pound, supra note 19. 
26. See CLARK, REAL COVENANTS AND lNTERESrS RUNNING WITH THE LAND 172 (2d 
ed. 1947). 
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owner of the dominant estate is regarded as having an equitable 
property interest in the servient estate which is specifically enforce-
able as in the case of any interest in land, subject to the traditional 
equity rule referred to above27 that a subsequent purchaser of a legal 
interest, for value and without notice, is protected against prior 
equities. 
Seldom is any one of these theories consistently relied on in a 
jurisdiction; in many cases the courts of the same state will be found 
to have employed a combination of all of them.28 Some writers have 
charitably ascribed this confusion to the fact that the courts want to 
achieve socially desirable results without being unduly restricted by 
doctrine.29 Certainly it is true that the equitable servitude device has 
fulfilled the socially desirable function of allowing private individ-
uals to exercise control over the use of land which they do not own, 
free from the rigid technicalities which encumbered other legal de-
vices designed to accomplish similar objectives.80 Nevertheless, it is 
the opinion of this writer that the almost universal failure to articu-
late a fundamental rationale for the law of equitable servitudes is 
not really explainable as a product of judicial sophistication. For 
every case decided by an enlightened court intent on preserving the 
flexibility of a valuable legal tool, there are ten decided on the basis 
of faulty authority which reach results that are at best dubious.81 
27. See text accompanying note 12 supra. 
28. "In the end we may find that they have come together so often and in so many 
ways that there is no longer space between the paths, no longer choice to make be-
tween them. What began as a contractual right may be so protected by remedies, legal 
and equitable, that it will be indistinguishable from a real interest •••• " Bristol v. 
Woodward, 251 N.Y. 275, 289, 167 N.E. 441, 446 (1929) (Cardozo, J.). 
29. See Reno, supra note 24, at 978. 
30. E.g., nuisances, conditions with right of entry, determinable fees, and easements 
and covenants which run with the land. See CHAFEE & RE, CAsEs ON EQUITY 401-02 
(4th ed. 1958). 
31. In Massachusetts, for instance, the traditional reluctance to enforce third-party 
beneficiary contracts would appear to offer an argument against adoption of the con-
tract theory of enforcement of equitable servitudes, and in favor of the property the-
ory. In Sprague v. Kimball, 213 Mass. 380, 100 N.E. 622 (1912), the court appeared to 
adopt the property theory by holding that the real property sections of the Statute of 
Frauds are applicable to such agreements, thus rendering unenforceable an oral agree• 
ment by the common grantor to impose certain common restrictions on lots to be 
conveyed in the future. The court did not discuss the fact that technically the Statute 
of Frauds is not complied with in many cases of express covenants enforced by the 
grantor against the grantee, since the writing is often not signed by the party to be 
charged. Compare Snow v. Van Dam, 291 Mass. 477, 197 N.E. 224 (1934). The unfor-
tunate consequences of not working out the theoretical underpinnings of the law of 
equitable servitudes are demonstrated by the later case of Patrone v. Fatone, 345 Mass. 
659, 189 N.E.2d 228 (1963), where the court inexplicably refused to enforce an express 
restriction even though the deed stated that "these restrictions arc imposed for the 
benefit of the other lot-owners in the development." For a brave but futile effort to 
resolve this muddle, see the excellent Note, 44 B.U.L. REv. 231 (1964). 
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Nowhere is the headnote syndrome-that plague occasioned by the 
amazing proliferation of case authority available in recent years-
more apparent than here.32 
B. Recording Acts and the Concept of 
Constructive Notice 
For our purposes it is perhaps sufficient to note that, whatever 
the theory employed by the courts in this area, notice of the exis-
tence of the restriction on the part of the purchaser of the retained 
servient estate is deemed necessary in order to allow the enforcement 
of the servitude by the owner of the dominant estate. In the typical 
situation previously described, if grantee A's deed to tract A con-
tained an express restriction on the use of the grantor's retained land 
(tract B), then grantee A (or his purchaser or assignee) must demon-
strate that grantee B took tract B with knowledge of the restriction. 
In terms of the effect of the recording statute, the question is whether 
the recording of the deed to tract A constitutes constructive notice 
to the purchaser of tract B. If it does not, the purchaser · of tract B 
takes free and clear of the restriction unless he has some form of 
actual notice. 
In virtually all of the early cases, the courts found notice and 
decided in favor of the owner of the dominant estate. In the leading 
case of Holt v. Fleischman,33 for example, the court recognized the 
difficulty in treating the deed to grantee A as being in grantee B's 
"chain of title," but concluded that since "it is intimately related" 
to the land retained by the common grantor, it therefore serves to 
give the subsequent purchaser "constructive notice." In 1910 the 
Supreme Court of Missouri reached the same conclusion, but also 
relied on the concept of inquiry notice, since the deed to the subse-
quent purchaser contained the language, "all of the said above de-
32. The symptoms characteristic of the headnote syndrome are the citation of vo-
luminous authority on questions of law where few cases exactly in point are likely to 
have been decided. The disease produces bad law. Unfortunately, few headnoters are 
as candid as J. W. Shepard, reporter for the Supreme Court of Alabama, who foot-
noted his syllabus in the case of Drake v. State, 51 Ala. 30 (1874), as follows: "The 
reporter does not believe that the opinion in· this case was intended to change the 
settled rule of law. as laid down in the several cases cited, and he has therefore made 
the headnote conform to those cases, and not to the language of the opinion." 
33. 75 App. Div. 593, 78 N.Y. Supp. 647 (1902). The only authority cited in this 
case is Mott v. Oppenheimer, 135 N.Y. 312, 31 N.E. 1097, 17 L.R.A. 409 (1892). The 
Mott case, although frequently cited in early cases dealing with the general problem, 
is not in point. It merely holds that the omission of a reference to a restrictive cove-
nant in the deed of the servient estate on which the defendant relies does not serve 
to make him a BFP if such restrictions are contained in prior deeds in his direct 
chain of title. 
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scribed real estate being subject to all restrictions now of record 
against same."34 In 1912 the New Jersey court held in a similar case80 
that the deed to the first grantee constitutes constructive notice of 
all restrictions contained therein to grantees of the retained land, 
but the opinion suggests that this result is only appropriate in cases 
involving adjoining lots. Thus we see for the first time a court con-
cerned with the scope of the title search it is imposing on the subse-
quent purchaser. In the 1915 Maryland case of Lewis v. Carter,86 the 
court rejected the frequently stated argument that a grantor's prom-
ise to make all retained land subject to such restrictions is personal 
to the grantor and thus unenforceable against subsequent grantees, 
regardless of notice.37 
In the same year that Lewis was decided, the New Jersey court, 
in Glorieux v. Lighthipe,88 rejected the contention that the deed to 
the first grantee constitutes constructive notice to a subsequent pur-
chaser of the retained tract. The court construed the wording of the 
New Jersey statute, which made recording notice only as to subse-
quent purchasers, to refer to "subsequent purchasers of the same 
land," and therefore refused to enforce the restriction against a sub-
sequent purchaser of the retained land who had no actual notice. In 
support of this result, the court offered the following policy argu-
ment: "A purchaser may well be held bound to examine or neglect 
at his peril, the record of conveyances under which he claims; but 
it would impose an intolerable burden to compel him to examine 
all conveyances made by everyone in his chain of title."89 
34. King v. St. Louis Union Trust, 226 Mo. 351, 126 S.W. 415 (1910). It is difficult 
to see how the doctrine of inquiry notice can be invoked by such a general statement 
. in a deed, and, indeed, the court cited no authority. With respect to the "chain of 
title" problem, the court reasoned that because the authorities state that the vendee 
is not expected to look for conveyances from his vendor prior to the time the vendor 
acquired title, by implication he is required to search the registry for all conveyances 
from the vendor after the latter acquired title. In addition to Holt and Mott v. op. 
penheimer, supra note 33, the court cited two other cases, neither of which was on 
point. 
35. Howland v. Andrus, 80 N.J. Eq. 276, 83 Atl. 982 (1912). This was a case of 
first impression in New Jersey, and the court cited no authority from any jurisdic• 
tion in support of its result . 
. 36. 124 Md. 678, 93 Atl. 216 (1915). 
37. The court also rejected the argument that there can be no constructive notice 
since the recording statute does not authorize the recording of a restrictive covenant. 
The court reasoned that "the restrictions imposed by the deed on the land retained 
by the grantor constitute an easement in favor of the property conveyed" and that 
the interest was therefore recordable. Id. at 680, 93 Atl. at 218. 
38. 88 N.J.L. 199, 96 Atl. 94 (1915). 
39. Id. at 202, 96 Atl. at 96. The court also rejected the limitation to adjoining 
land suggested in Howland v. Andrus. See note 35 supra and accompanying text. 
"[It] is not suggested by any language in the statute and would lead to an anoma• 
Ious situation. It would charge with notice the purchaser of an adjoining lot, but 
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Of all the subsequent cases which have reaffirmed the position 
taken by the court in Holt that the recording of the deed to grantee 
A is constructive notice to grantee B, relatively few have addressed 
themselves to the policy argument in Glorieux. An exception is the 
case of Finley v. Glenn,40 where the Pennsylvania court pointed out 
that, under the recording statute, "when plaintiff, the first grantee, 
recorded his deed, he did all that he could do to give notice of the 
restrictions."41 This observation, it seems, goes to the heart of the 
matter. It is good to be concerned with the title-search burden 
placed on the subsequent purchaser, but what of the burden on the 
first grantee who has complied with the recording requirement but 
is nevertheless threatened with loss of the benefit of a valuable re-
strictive covenant? Unfortunately, the problem, which, as will be 
shown below, is far from unsolvable, is seldom discussed in terms of 
competing interests unnecessarily jeopardized by certain mechanical 
defects in the recording system. Instead, the courts have generally 
focused attention on only one side of the problem-usually the title-
search burden upon the buyer of the servient estate-or, even less , 
excusably, have been content to cite collections of cases standing for 
a non-existent "general rule." 
C. The Chain-of-Title Approach 
One unfortunate tangent taken by many courts concerns the 
problem of the "chain of title." The rule that a recorded deed lying 
outside of a purchaser's chain of title is not constructive notice of the 
instrument as to that purchaser is, of course, applied in a wide va-
riety of situations.42 The rationale of the rule is that under the pre-
vailing grantor-grantee method of indexing records there is little 
likelihood that even the most diligent grantee will be able to find 
pertinent instruments executed by a "stranger" to the chain of title 
under which he claims,43 or.executed by a person "within" the chain 
of title, but prior or subsequent to the time he was a record owner 
of the title affected.44 
not the purchaser of an adjoining lot but one, on the same large tract." Id. at 200, 
96 Ad. at 95. 
40. 303 Pa. 131, 154 Atl. 299 (1931). 
41. Id. at 133, 154 Atl. at 302. 
42. For an excellent survey and discussion, see 5 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 1265 
(3d ed. 1939). 
43. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. Slye, 164 Cal. 435, 129 Pac. 589 (1913); Greer v. 
Carter Oil Co., 373 Ill. 168, 25 N.E.2d 805 (1940); Sinclair v. Gunzenhauser, 179 Ind. 
78, 98 N.E. 37 (1912). 
44. Many of these cases involve the so-called "after-acquired title" doctrine. See, 
e.g., 4 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 1231 (3d ed. 1939). 
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For present purposes, then, the question is whether the same ra• 
tionale can be applied to a situation where the person executing the 
instrument at issue appears as a grantee in the chain of title of the 
servient estate and executed the instrument while the owner of 
record, but where, in the execution of the instrument, the granting 
of a restrictive covenant as to the land in question is only secondary 
to the primary purpose of conveying other land owned by the com-
mon grantor. In both classes of cases there exists the practical prob• 
lem of title search, but in the typical "chain of title" case it is the 
position of the grantor that causes the difficulty, whereas in our 
problem it is the character of the instrument which leads the ab-
stracter astray. When viewed in this light, the chain-of-title approach 
is merely a circuitous way of articulating the burden-of-title-search 
argument. _Unfortunately, most courts have tended to ignore the 
rationale of the chain-of-title rule and have assumed without dis-
cussion its applicability, the question for their purposes being whe-
ther the deed to the first grantee is to be technically regarded as part 
of the chain of title of the grantee of the retained land. Thus it is 
not surprising that the courts approaching the problem from this 
viewpoint have given a variety of answers. In the Holt case, for 
example, the court disposed of the problem by observing that, while 
the deed is not directly within the second grantee's chain of title, 
"yet it is intimately related to the land retained ... [by the common 
grantor] when she made the covenant."45 
The case of King v. St. Louis Union Trust46 is an even better ex-
ample of a court failing to examine the rationale of the chain-of-title 
rule. After referring to cases involving after-acquired titles, the court 
concluded in a classic non sequitur that, because the vendee in such 
situations is not expected to look for conveyances from his vendor 
prior to the time the vendor acquired title, by implication he is re-
quired to search the registry for all conveyances from his vendor 
after the time the vendor acquired title. To round out the picture 
of confusion thus presented, at least one court seems to have indi-
cated that the question is not whether the deed is "in" the chain of 
title, but rather whether the deed "affects or relates to" the chain of 
title.47 Under this wording of the requirement, the extent to which 
the covenant affects the land, rather than the problem of title search, 
would appear to be crucial. This is arguably a commendable shift 
45. Holt v. Fleischman, 75 App. Div. 593, 600, 78 N.Y. Supp. 647, 652 (1902), The 
significance of the "intimate relationship" is not explained. 
46. 226 Mo. 351, 126 S.W. 415 (1910). 
47. Maule Indus. v. Scheffield Steel Prods., 105 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 1958). 
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of emphasis, but it is questionable whether it relates to the tradi-
tional "chain of title" doctrine. In still another case48 the suggestion 
was made that deeds in these situations may be regarded as being 
within the chain of title in the sense that a deed of trust, judgment, 
or other record lien imposed during the period of the common 
grantor's ownership is within the chain of title. If one considers the 
rationale behind the chain-of-title requirement, however, it becomes 
apparent that such an analogy breaks down; the title-search problem 
is by no means the same. 
Among the decisions which have held that grantee B does not 
have constructive notice of the deed to grantee A, there has been a 
greater appreciation of the rationale of the chain-of-title require-
ment.49 In the leading New York case of Buffalo Academy of the 
Sacred Heart v. Boehm Bros.,50 the court explicitly recognized the 
relationship between the chain-of-title requirement and the burden-
of-title-search problem: 
[T]his rule [the chain-of-title rule] would seem to be implicit in 
the acts providing for the recording of conveyances. Recording 
constitutes notice only of the instruments in the chain of title 
of the parcel granted. To have to search each chain of title from 
a common grantor lest notice be imputed would seem to nega-
tive the beneficent purposes o~ the recording acts.51 
This quotation, which reflects a commendable understanding of 
the policy behind the rule of law invoked, also suggests the difficulties 
which are encountered in trying to resolve the problem by resort to 
the ratio legis of the recording system. Certainly the rule rejected 
by the court would not negate the "beneficent purposes of the record-
ing acts," if one such purpose is to compel every person "receiving 
such an interest (by which the ownership and enjoyment of land 
can be affected) to place it upon the records, in order that he may 
thereby protect his mm rights as well as those of all others who may 
aftenvards acquire an interest in the same property.''52 On the con-
trary, the decision of the court irrevocably prejudiced the rights of 
48. Reed v. Elmore, 246 N.C. 221, 98 S.E.2d 360 (1957) (concurring opinion). 
49. However, a few of these cases have invoked the chain-of-title rule without any 
supporting discussion. See Thompson v. Radall, 173 Ga. 696, 161 S.E. 377 (1931); cf. 
Sullivan v. Milford, 143 Iowa 210, 121 N.W. 569 (1909). Similarly, other courts have 
applied this rule in addition to accepting the argument relating to the unreasonable 
title-search burden that would otherwise be imposed on grantee B. See, e.g., Hancock v. 
Gumm, 151 Ga. 667, 107 S.E. 872 (1921). 
50. 267 N.Y. 242, 196 N.E. 42 (1935). 
51. Id. at 250, 196 N.E. at 45. 
52. This ratio legis was stated in 2 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 649 (5th ed. 
1941). 
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a recording purchaser (grantee A) as well as "those of all others who 
may aftenvards acquire an interest in the same property." 
D. Balancing the Equities Between Two 
Innocent Parties 
In reality, as has been suggested previously, a satisfactory solu-
tion to this problem cannot really be achieved by resort to analysis 
of the "purpose" of the recording system. Rather, it would appear 
preferable to recognize that in these cases the recording system is 
often incapable (through no fault of grantee A) of giving construc-
tive notice to grantee B without imposing upon him a very substan-
tial title-search burden. Before a court can choose between grantee 
A and grantee B, several important questions should be answered. 
How great in fact is the burden on grantee B? How substantial are 
the interests of grantee A? Can the interests of grantee A be pro-
tected by means other than at the expense of grantee B? 
I. Burden Imposed on Grantees of the 
Servient Estate 
With respect to the burden on grantee B, most courts08 have ap-
proved the language of the Glorieux opinion and have refused "to 
compel him to examine all conveyances made by everyone in his 
chain of title."54 Clearly, such a burden would often be intolerable, 
but this seems to be an overstatement of the case. It would be more 
accurate to say that grantee B would be compelled to examine all 
conveyances made by everyone in his chain of title while those 
persons where the owners of record of the property he is pur-
chasing. Since under the grantor-grantee system of indexing the 
title searcher will make note of all such deeds, the question is 
whether the abstracter may disregard "deeds out" (of the chain of 
title) which appear, on the basis of the brief geographical descrip-
tion in the index, not to affect the locus. It is arguable that the bur-
den imposed by not allowing the abstracter to disregard such "deeds 
out" is de minimis unless a prior grantor, within the period of the 
title search, 05 was the developer of a large subdivision. In most cases, 
53. See, e.g., Hancock v. Gumm, 151 Ga. 667, 107 S.E. 872 (1921): Young v. Calley 
Land Co., 103 N.J. Eq. 478, 143 Atl. 627 (1928): Buffalo Academy of the Sacred Heart v. 
Boehm Bros., 267 N.Y. 242, 196 N.E. 42 (1935). 
54. See note 39 supra and accompanying text. 
55. In practice, the period of time that will be covered in a title search varies 
greatly among jurisdictions. In Massachusetts many attorneys follow the rule of "sixty 
years to a warranty deed," whereas in other jurisdictions it is expected that the 
abstracter will go back to the beginning of the chain of title. See, e.g., CASNER &: LEACH, 
CAsES oN PROPERTY 896, 926 (1951). Local practice is, of course, affected by the various 
types of marketable title acts. For example, a recent Massachusetts act, MASS, GEN, 
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presumably, the number of "deeds out" would be few, and the fact 
that equitable servitudes are normally appurtenant56 could still fur-
ther reduce the number of "deeds out" to. be examined by exclud-
ing "deeds out" to tracts sufficiently remote from the locus as to pre-
vent them from being the dominant estate.57 
In cases where the developer of a large subdivision is in the chain 
of title, it may well be that the burden on the abstracter is rather 
considerable, although no effort has apparently been made to pass 
legislation ameliorating the burdeh in jurisdictions where it has 
been imposed.58 Whether the burden is lessened by the use of a tract 
index is not clear, although tract indexing has been suggested as a 
solution to the problem.59 The question, with respect to the· tract 
index, is whether the person responsible for the indexing will recog-
nize that a "deed out" contains restrictions which relate to the re-
tained land. If he tract-indexes only deeds containing a specific de-
scription of property, a deed making a general reference to all other 
land retained by the grantor might be · ignored. Furthermore, it 
should be recognized that, even if we could conclude that the tract 
index is an effective tool for discovering relevant "deeds out," the 
widespread use of the tract index by private abstract and title car- · 
porations is not necessarily determinative of the question of record 
or constructive notice, since the use of such indexes is seldom re-
quired by statute.60 Thus, one might argue that a subsequent pur-
LAws .ANN. ch. 184, § 26-30 (Supp. 1964-), requires periodic re-recording of restrictive 
covenants. For an analysis of the problems raised by such legislation, see 4-4- B.U.L. 
REv. 201 (1964). 
56. While it is perhaps theoretically possible that a grantor might impose equitable . 
servitudes in gross by means of a deed to land not intended as the dominant estate, 
it is doubtful in many jurisdictions whether such a restriction would be enforceable 
against a subsequent purchaser of the servient tenement even if he had notice. See 
London County Council v. Allan, [1914] 3 K.B. 642 (n.s.) Contra, Vansant v. Rose, 
260 Ill. 401, 103 N.E. 194 (1913). See generally I CHAFEE & SIMPSON, CASES ON EQUITY 
774.77 (1st ed. 1934). 
57. It must be emphasized that this suggestion cannot be supported by case au-
thority. The author knows of no cases which have expressly held that a tract remote 
from the land subject to the equitable restrictions cannot, as matter of law, be the 
dominant estate. On the other hand, in all cases herein discussed involving the "deeds 
out" problem, the dominant and servient estates have in fact been in the same vicinity. 
58. According to a leading work in Massachusetts title practice, experienced title 
examiners apparently assume the responsibility for examing such "deeds out" as a 
matter of course; only passing reference was made to the onerous nature of such a 
procedure. See CROCKER, Non:s ON COMMON FoRMs 557 (7th ed. 1955). The leading 
Massachusetts cases on this question assume that there is constructive notice. See, e.g., 
Beekman v. Schirmer, 239 Mass. 265, 132 N.E. 45 (1921}; Riley v. Barron, 227 Mass. 
325, 116 N.E. 473 (1917). 
59. See Note, 21 CORNELL LQ. 479 (1936). 
60. For a general discussion of the statutory use of the tract index, see Fairchild, 
Improvement in Recording and Indexing Methods for Real Property Instruments, 28 
GEO. L;J. 307 (1939). 
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chaser has actual notice if the "deed out" appears in his abstract,61 
perhaps even arguing that the abstract company is negligent if it 
fails to include such deeds, 62 and yet refuse to treat the "deed out" 
as constituting constructive notice of the restrictions therein con-
tained.63 
Before leaving the question of the extent of the burden on the 
subsequent purchaser of the servient estate, it should be noted that 
in a way it is artificial to restrict that inquiry to the burden of title 
search. One might logically also discuss the "burden" on grantee B 
in terms of the inconvenience caused by compliance with the restric-
tions involved. How seriously will he be injured if forced to comply 
with the restrictions allegedly imposed on his tract by the common 
grantor? Arguably this question might also be considered in terms 
of the interest of the community in having the restriction enforced. 
The latter consideration is particularly significant, it would seem, if 
one regards private land-use controls as a desirable adjunct of public 
controls, such as zoning and subdivision requirements. Although ju-
dicial toleration for arguments of this sort varies considerably, it is 
curious that the case law and the secondary material are virtually 
devoid of any discussion along the lines here suggested. 
2. Importance of Protecting the Dominant Estate 
It would appear incontrovertible that grantee A's ownership in-
terest in the dominant estate is very substantial indeed. The litera-
ture in this field has repeatedly emphasized that the development of 
the law of equitable servitudes was in response to the need of an 
increasingly urbanized society for effective control of private land 
61. See Taylor v. Melton, 130 Colo. 272, 274 P.2d 977 (1954), where the defendant 
was held to have had notice of a "deed out" which appeared in the abstract of title, 
This decision is interesting in light of the fact that Colorado is presumably a "non• 
deeds out" jurisdiction by virtue of the holding in Judd v. Robinson, 41 Colo. 222, 
92 Pac. 724 (Super. Ct. 1907) (semble). · 
62. This argument was unsuccessful in Lizzo v. Craft, 135 N.Y.S.2d 748 (Sup, Ct, 
1954), appeal dismissed, 284 App. Div. 862, 135 N.Y.S.2d 777 (1954), even though there 
was some evidence that it was the practice of the abstract company to include such 
"deeds out" in abstracts prepared for transactions involving other lots in the area. 
63. One difficulty with the argument that the existence of a tract index does not 
result in constructive notice of "deeds out" because it is not required by statute is 
that in other contexts the question of constructive notice has frequently been di• 
vorced from the question of whether the statute specifies that the index is itself a 
part of the record. For example, even where the statute does not so specify, a major-
ity of courts hold that the recording acts protect the grantee of a properly recorded, 
but improperly indexed, deed. See 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 17.25; 5 TIFFANY, 
REAL PROPERTY § 1274 (3d ed. 1939). These decisions would appear to refute the 
contention that the question of notice depends on the title-search burden, that is, tl1e 
probability that the subsequent purchaser will be able to discover the pertinent docu-
ment by a diligent search of the records. . 
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use beyond that provided by the traditional tort doctrines of trespass 
and nuisance. 64 The willingness of the courts to abandon the tradi-
tional restrictive notions of privity of estate ·and contract in an effort 
to create an effective remedy for the enforcement of equitable servi-
tudes offers an indication of the importance of what is at stake.65 
Furthermore, we see that even with the advent of effective public 
land-use controls, the private control-because of its flexibility with 
respect to both enforcement and substantive scope-continues to 
flourish.66 Nearly every authority in the land-use planning area ex-
pounds virtues of the private control and recommends its utilization. 
The elaborate procedural safeguards employed by marketable title 
legislation,61 as well as the applicability of just-compensation re-
quirements to equitable servitudes in eminent domain proceed-
ings, 68 are further indications that we are dealing with a valuable 
right, whether it is characterized as property or as contractual. 
3. Additional Methods for Protecting the 
Dominant Estate 
It would thus appear highly desirable that the courts, in dealing 
with equitable servitudes, recognize what ·both sides in such a con-
troversy may have at stake. But even if such judicial understanding 
becomes commonplace, in many of these situations one of two inno-
cent persons will be injured by any decision the court reaches. This 
possibility brings into focus the question of how the owner of the 
dominant estate may protect himself. In this respect, two levels of 
· inquiry are relevant. Can he protect himself within the framework 
of the present recording system? If not, how can the system be rea-
sonably altered to accomplish that objective? 
The first of these inquiries is obviously relevant to the process of 
deciding existing controversies. If the o-wner of the dominant estate, 
although technically in compliance with the requirements of the 
recording statute, has overlooked a method of employing the record-
ing system which is more reasonably calculated to give actual notice 
to a diligent purchaser of the servient estate, then perhaps the courts 
64. For an extensive citation of background material, see CHAFEE &: RE, CASES ON 
EQUITY 401 (4th ed. 1958). 
65. See 1 CHAFEE & SIMPSON, CASES ON EQUITY 799, 842 (1st ed. 1934). 
66. For a discussion of the impact of zoning on the validity or enforceability of 
private covenants, see La Follette, Equitable Restriction and Government Regulation 
of Private Land Use, 10 SYRACUSE L. REv. 78 (1958); Van Hecke, Zoning Ordinances 
and Restrictions in Deeds, 37 YALE L.J. 407 (1928). 
67. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 184, § 26-30 (Supp. 1964). 
68. For an excellent discussion, see BEUSCHER, LAND USE CONTROLS 147-49 (3d ed. 
1964). 
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should take a jaundiced view of his invocation of a "balancing test" 
based on the mutual "innocence" of both parties to the litigation. 00 
In many cases, of course, the developer may have solved the prob-
lem by recording, prior to the public sale of any parcels within the 
subdivision, a master plan or plat on which all restrictions and ease-
ments are duly noted. In such circumstances nearly all authorities 
agree that subsequent purchasers receive both the benefit and the 
burden of such easements and restrictions.70 Unfortunately, from 
the developer's point of view such a practice may prove undesirable, 
in that it deprives him of flexibility in responding to experience 
gathered in marketing the first homes in the subdivision. 71 Further-
more, a master plan is seldom used in the case of isolated transac-
tions where a single large lot is subdivided into only two or three 
smaller lots.72 Another possible solution is for the purchaser to de-
mand a covenant in his deed that the grantor will include in each 
deed creating an independent tenement in the remaining land a 
recital that the estate is subject to the easements and covenants con-
tained in the earlier grantee's deed.73 The difficulty with this solu-
tion is that there is no way the first grantee can be sure that the 
grantor will keep his promise. The tremendous amount of litigation 
in the area is evidence that the grantor often fails to comply with 
the agreement. Money damages are obviously an inadequate remedy. 
It might be wise for the cautious grantee, rather than relying on 
the grantor's covenant, to demand from the grantor a separate deed 
expressly imposing restrictions on the land retained by the grantor, 
which would be described with the same formalities as required for 
the transfer of the fee. The recording of such an instrument should 
theoretically give notice to any subsequent purchaser of the servient 
estate, under either a grantor-grantee or a tract indexing system and 
regardless of whether the jurisdiction adheres to the "deeds out" 
69. Cf. Gilpin v. Jacob Ellis Realties, Inc., 47 N.J. Super. 26, 135 A.2d 204 (App. 
Div. 1957). 
70. It is not always clear whether this result is based on the doctrine of "con• 
structive" notice, or "inquiry" notice. See Adams v. Rowles, 228 S.W .2d 849 (Sup, Ct, 
. Tex. 1950). Compare the discussion in URBAN LAND INS11TUTE, THE HOMES ASSOCIATION 
HANDBOOK § 22.22 (1964). See also BEUSCHER, LAND USE CONTROLS 120 (3d ed. 1964). 
71. This may be partially avoided by utilizing the so-called "staged development," 
where the builder develops a tract in smaller units, establishing the restrictions for 
each separate section or stage as it is reached. See the excellent discussion in URDAN 
I.AND INS11TUTE, op. dt. supra note 70, § 22.4. The same problem may be occasioned 
by application of the doctrine of reciprocal negative easements in cases where there 
is no recorded plat. See note 84 infra. 
72. Even this may technically qualify as a "subdivision" within the purview of 
subdivision control legislation requiring that the seller file a plat, See, e.g., MASS, GEN, 
LAWS ANN. ch. 41, § SIL (Supp. 1964). 
73. See Philbrick, Limits of Record Search and Notice, 93 U. PA. L. REv. 259, 274 
(1945). 
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rule. 74 An alternative, which involves some tinkering with the me-
chanics of the recording system, is legislation permitting the mvner 
of the dominant estate (grantee A) to record an affidavit analogous to 
the statutory mechanic's lien notice employed in most jurisdictions.75 
E. Covenants That Are Personal to the Grantor 
So far, we have discussed situations where the intent of the par-
ties is fairly certain. The grantor clearly intended to impose the re-
strictions on the retained land, and the question for the court is 
whether that intent should be effectuated as against innocent sub-
sequent purchasers of t~e servient estate. The courts have often 
resolved the cases in terms of "notice," but we have traced the theo-
retical and practical difficulties of such an approach. There is, how-
ever, another category of restrictive covenant cases which the courts 
have frequently treated as being theoretically similar to the situation 
described above, but which in reality involve quite different consid-
erations. In the latter group of cases, the real issue is whether the 
grantor actually intended to impose restrictions on the land retained. 
If the language contained in the deed to grantee A is construed 
as creating a mere personal undertaking by the grantor, the question 
of whether a subsequent purchaser of the "servient" estate. had no-
tice of the restriction becomes irrelevant. In one of the earliest cases 
in which this argument was raised, the court was dealing with a cov-
enant which declared that "each and every one of the lots" would be 
"subject to all of the restrictions" imposed on tract A "whether the 
said lots be sold or retained" by the grantor.76 The court held that 
this language was a clear indication that the covenant. was not per-
sonal to the grantor, and therefore proceeded to consider the ques-
tion of notice. Other courts have found language purporting to bind 
the grantor's "heirs and assigns" determinative that the covenant was 
not personal.77 A typical situation giving rise to the argument that 
a covenant is personal to the grantor involves a provision in the deed 
74. The beneficial effect of this simple expedient must be characterized as theo-
retical, since the author knows of no litigated cases where it was employed, or of any 
area where it is the local practice. 
75. A similar device is employed by the new Massachusetts Marketable Title Act, 
MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 184, § 26-30 (Supp. 1964), in connection with the require-
ment that restrictions be re-recorded after thirty years. In order to be effective against 
a parcel the notice of extension must: (1) be indexed in the grantor's index under 
the names of the persons specified therein as the owners of the subject parcel; (2) be 
noted on the margins of the record of the instrument creating the restrictions if it 
is recorded; and (3) be indexed in a special tract index to be maintained for such 
purpose by each register of deeds. 
76. Lowes v. Carter, 124 Md. 678, 93 Atl. 216 (1915). 
77. See, e.g., Wood v. Stehrer, 119 Md. 143, 147, 86 Atl. 128, 129 (1912). 
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to grantee A promising that covenants identical to those imposed on 
tract A will be included in all subsequent deeds by the grantor to 
other purchasers of nearby land. Although such covenants have on 
occasion been characterized as personal to the grantor, 78 it is argu-
able that subsequent purchasers of the other lots with notice of the 
covenant might still be bound under an application of the maxim, 
"equity regards as done that which ought to be done."79 
F. The Effect of a Common Plan 
In many cases the courts have intertwined the argument that the 
covenant is personal with the argument of lack of notice, and for 
this reason it is difficult to ascertain the position of such jurisdictions 
with respect to the question of record or constructive notice by vir-
tue of "deeds out."80 This is particularly true in cases where the 
court purports to base its decision on the existence or non-existence 
of a common plan or scheme. A casual reading of many such opin-
ions will lead to the conclusion that, in order to enforce a covenant 
in a case involving a plaintiff other than the original grantor, the 
individual seeking to enforce the restriction must demonstrate that 
the covenant was imposed as part of a common plan or scheme.81 
Initially this might seem to be simply another way of determining 
whether a covenant is personal to the original grantor,82 but a care-
ful analysis will indicate that at the conceptual level, at least, the 
problem is far more complex, with the theoretical function of the 
78. See, e.g., Buckley v. Mooney, 339 Mich. 398, 63 N.W.2d 655 (1954). 
79. Id. at 400, 63 N.W.2d at 659 (dissenting opinion). 
80. The early New York cases, for example, took the position that grantee B 
(servicnt estate) is held to constructive notice of covenants contained in prior deeds 
to grantee A (dominant estate). See Holt v. Fleischman, 75 App. Div. 593, 78 N.Y. 
Supp. 647 (1902); Whistler v. Cole, 81 Misc. 519, 143 N.Y. Supp. 478 (1913); Mott v. 
Oppenheimer, 135 N.Y. 312, 31 N.E. 1097 (1892) (by implication). However, in the 
leading case of Buffalo Academy of the Sacred Heart v. Boehm Bros., 267 N.Y. 242, 
196 N.E. 42 (1935), the court, in holding for the owner of the scrvient estate, articu-
lated two different possible grounds for its decision: (1) "the covenant on the part 
of the grantor only purports to be a personal undertaking • • • ," and (2) "in the 
absence of actual notice before or at the time of his purchase • • • an owner of land is 
only bound by restrictions if they 'appear in some deed of record in the conveyance 
to himself or his direct predecessors in title.'' Id. at 248, 250, 196 N.E. at 44, 45. Sec 
also Lizzio v. Craft, 135 N.Y.S.2d 748 (Sup. Ct. 1954). It was not until the 1961 case 
of Eppolito v. Medlicott, 211 N.Y.S.2d 302 (Sup. Ct. 1961) that we find an unequivo-
cal statement that a purchaser is not bound by constructive notice, even though the 
covenant is construed as being intended to run with the land. It is interesting to 
note that the court then proceeded to hold in favor of the owner of the dominant 
estate on the ground that the defendant had actual notice. 
81. This is sometimes stated as if it were an absolute rule of law. See, e.g., Craven 
County v. First Citizens Bank &: Trust Co., 237 N.C. 502, 75 S.E.2d 620 (1953). 
82. "[S]ince the locus in quo had never been subject to any general plan of develop-
ment the restrictive covenants in the deeds. executed by the original developer as its 
successors, were never enforceable except as personal covenants." Reed v. Elmore, 246 
N.C. 221, 234, 98 S.E.2d 360, 367 (1957) (dissenting opinion). 
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existence of a common plan differing greatly depending upon the 
facts and upon the theory of enforcement employed. 
Consider, for example, a situation where a restrictive covenant is 
included in all deeds executed by the common grantor in a subdi-
vision, and a suit to enforce the restriction is brought by an earlier 
purchaser against a later purchaser. The enforcement action might 
be based on contract theory, since the existence of a common scheme . 
can be used to show the grantor's intent to make the prior purchaser 
(grantee A) a third party beneficiary <;>f the covenant included in the 
later deed to grantee B.83 Similarly, the common plan might be used 
to demonstrate the existence of an implied reciprocal negative ease-
ment in favor of the tract belonging to grantee A and burdening the 
land retained by the grantor and subsequently conveyed to grantee 
B. This second method of enforcement is based on property theory.84 
Under the contract theory of enforcement, notice should not be 
a problem in such cases because the covenant being enforced by 
grantee A is contained in the defendant's own deed or a deed in his 
direct chain of title. However, under the property theory of enforce-
ment, where grantee A is enforcing a right acquired under a theory 
of implied reciprocal negative easements, the question of notice 
could still be theoretically at issue, since grantee A's rights arise out 
of covenants made in his own deed and not those contained in the 
deed to grantee B. 85 If grantee B could show that he purchased with-
83. "The right of an owner of a lot to enforce a covenant (to which he is not a 
party or an assign) restrictive of the use of other lands is dependent on the covenant 
having been made for the benefit of this lot. . . . The right of grantees from the 
common grantor to enforce, inter se, covenants entered into by each with said grantor, 
is confined to cases where there has been proof of a general plan or scheme for the 
improvement of the property and its consequent benefit, and the covenant has been 
entered into as part of a general plan to be exacted from all purchasers, and to be 
for the benefit of each purchaser .••. " Mulligan v. Jordon, 50 N.J. Eq. 363, 365, 
24 Atl. 543, 544 (1892). See also Higdon v. Jaffa, 231 N.C. 242, 245, 56 S.E.2d 661, 666 
(1949), where the property theory of enforcement was apparently ruled out by virtue 
of the following clause in the plaintiff's deed: "Nothing herein contained shall be 
held to impose any restriction on or easements in any land of the [grantor] not hereby 
conveyed." Compare Humphrey v. Beall, 215 N.C. 15, 200 S.E. 918 (1939), where the 
failure to include the restrictive covenant in 4 lots out of 180 was deemed fatal to 
the plaintiff's case, even though the defendant's deed was one of those containing a 
restrictive covenant. 
84. "If the owner of two or more lots, so situated as to bear the relation, sells one 
with restrictions of benefit to the land retained, the servitude becomes mutual, and, 
during the period of the restraint, the owner of the lot or lots retained can do noth-
ing forbidden to the owner of the lot sold. For want of a better descriptive term this 
is styled a reciprocal negative easement. It runs with the land sold ..• and abides 
with the land retained •••. It is not personal to the owners but operates upon use 
of the land by any owner having actual or constructive notice thereof." Sanborn v. 
McLean, 233 Mich. 227, 229, 206 N.W. 496, 497 (1925). 
85. This is because of the historical difficulties inherent in an attempt to create 
an easement in favor of a third person. See 3 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY § 407, at 405 
(1952), 
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out notice of the rights acquired by grantee A, he could theoretically 
prevail over grantee A, even though he would be subject to an action 
by the common grantor or by a purchaser of a lot from the common 
grantor subsequent to the time of his own acquisition. However, 
there are four ways in which B could be held to have received the 
requisite notice: actual notice, constructive notice of the deed to 
grantee A in a "deeds out" jurisdiction, "inquiry" notice derived 
from the existence of covenants in B's own deed, and "inquiry" no-
tice derived from observation of the character of the subdivision or 
the condition of the neighborhood. It is only under the last approach 
that the existence of a uniform plan would serve a notice function 
in addition to the function of implying a reciprocal negative ease-
ment, and the evidence of what constitutes a uniform plan for the 
former purpose would obviously be quite different from that re-
quired for the latter. 86 
The same basic theoretical analysis applies in part in cases where 
the common grantor has omitted the restrictive covenants in some 
of the deeds, and an earlier grantor whose deed contained restric-
tions is attempting to enforce them against a later purchaser whose 
deed is free of restrictions. Again, under the theory of implied recip• 
rocal negative easements, 81 the rights of grantee A are not dependent 
on the existence of covenants contained in the deed to grantee B, 
and the notice problem is likewise the same, 88 except that there can 
86. Where the existence of a common scheme serves a notice function, the facts 
at the time of the sale to the subsequent purchaser should be determinative. Where 
the common scheme is used to imply a reciprocal negative covenant, however, the 
crucial point in time for determining the common scheme would appear to be the 
time of the sale to the lot owner seeking enforcement. But see Grant v. Hickols Oil 
Co., 84 Ohio App. 509, 87 N.E.2d 708 (1948), for a rather typical example of judicial 
failure to analyze carefully the significance of a common scheme in such a context. 
Compare Werner v. Graham, 181 Cal. 174, 183 Pac. 945 (1919), where the court ex-
plicitly recognized the illogic of allowing restrictions imposed in later deeds to be 
used as evidence that a common plan was intended at the time the common grantor 
sold to grantee A. If evidence that he included restrictions in later deeds is irrelevant 
to prove that he intended reciprocal negative covenants, surely his failure to do so 
should be equally irrelevant. There is considerable case authority for the proposition 
that a failure to place restrictions in every deed is not determinative of the right to 
enforce inter se. E.g., Tubbs v. Green, 30 Del. Ch. 151, 55 A.2d 445 (1947); Wayne v. 
Baker, 6 Ill. App. 2d 369, 128 N.E.2d 345 (1955); Adams v. Parater, 206 Md. 224, Ill 
A.2d 590 (1954). 
87. A few courts have refused to employ a theory of implied reciprocal negative 
covenants in such cases, on the ground that such a covenant is an interest in land 
covered by the Statute of Frauds and thus not provable by parol evidence. See, e.g., 
Hege v. Sellers, 241 N.C. 240, 84 S.E.2d 892 (1954); sec also Sprague v. Kimball, 213 
Mass. 380, 100 N.E. 622 (1912). 
88. With respect to the notice problem in this situation, see, e.g., Sanborn v. 
McLean, 233 Mich. 227, 206 N.W. 496 (1925), where the court held that because of 
the character of the neighborhood, the defendant was "put to inquiry" and that if 
he had made inquiry he would have found "of record" (presumably by virtue of the 
other deeds from the common grantor) the existence of the restrictions. Other Michi-
gan cases illustrate the other ways in which the notice requirement can be satisfied, 
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obviously be no "inquiry" notice derived from restrictive covenants 
contained in grantee B's deed. In such, a situation, however, if we 
employ a contract theory of enforcement we see that there are new 
and different problems both with respect to the question of notice 
and the nature of the right sought to be e~forced by grantee A. 
Since there is no express covenant binding on grantee B which can 
be enforced by grantee A as a third party beneficiary, notice should 
be irrelevant unless it can be shown that the common grantor has 
breached a promise to include such covenants in all subsequent 
deeds. If that can be established, then a purchaser who had notice 
of the promise might be bound under a theory of estoppel. The 
showing of a common scheme might serve two functions in such a 
case. It may be evidence of a promise by the common grantor to 
insert the covenants in later deeds,89 and it may serve as a basis for 
imputing knowledge to grantee B.90 
Before leaving the subject of the "common scheme" as it relates 
to the question of notice, mention should be made of cases dealing 
with the so-called "resubdivision" problem. If the grantor (0) sells 
tracts of land to A and B respectively, inserting in each deed certain 
restrictive covenants, and A then resubdivides his tract into a number 
of smaller lots, a question may arise as to whether the · owners of 
these lots may enforce inter se the restrictions contained in A's deed, 
when no similar restrictions were inserted in the subsequent deeds 
from A. The cases dealing with the resubdivision situation often 
purport to make the existence or non-existence of a common plan 
E.g., McQuade v. Wilcox, 215 Mich. 302; 183 N.W. 771 (1921) (constructive notice by 
virtue of "deeds out"); Allen v. City of Detroit, 167 Mich. 464, 133 N.W. 317 (1911) 
(actual notice by virtue of a written memorandum). See also Stark v. Robar, 339 Mich. 
145, 63 N.W .2d 606 (1954). These cases illustrate the confusion which may exist within 
the same jurisdiction concerning the notice problem. After the "deeds out" holding of 
McQuade v. Wilcox, supra, it is difficult to see why the concept of actual or inquiry 
notice need be utilized in such situations. On the other hand, in jurisdictions which 
refuse to imply reciprocal negative covenants, the court will refuse to enjoin restric-
tions even though the purchaser has "actual" notice. E.g., Mccurdy v. Stodard Realty 
Corp., 295 Ky. 587, 175 S.W.2d 28 (1943). But see McLean v. Thurman, 273 S;W.2d 
825 (Ky. Ct. App. 1954). 
89. For a classic example of this approach, see Johnson v. Mt. Baker Park Presby-
. terian Church, 113 Wash. 458, 194 Pac. 536 (1920). 
90. It should be noted .that there is usually no notice problem involved in cases 
where a subsequent purchaser is suing a prior purchaser on the basis of a covenant 
inserted in the first grantee's deed. The court may be concerned with the theory of 
enforcement (i.e., whether grantee B is an assignee of the common grantor's covenant 
or the purchaser of a dominant estate) and may employ the concept of a "common 
scheme" accordingly, but will not encounter a notice problem with respect to grantee 
A (the covenant is in his deed or the deed of his predecessor in title) or grantee B 
(since it is well settled that ordinarily at the time of purchase one .need not have 
notice of the existence of a restriction benefiting his land in order subsequently to 
enforce it). Rogers v. Hosegood, [1900] 2 Ch. 388. But see Union of London and 
Smith's Bank Ltd's Conveyance, [1933] I Ch. 611. 
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determinative of the question of enforcement.91 Unfortunately, the 
cases frequently fail to distinguish between situations where A fails 
to insert restrictions in the deeds of the resubdivided lots and cases 
where he inserts new restrictions or attempts to incorporate restric-
tions contained in his deed from 0. Conceptually, the problem of 
allowing the owners of the resubdivided lots to enforce inter se is 
quite difficult in the former cases,92 while in the latter situations the 
problem is no different from what has been previously discussed.98 
The purpose of showing a "common scheme," therefore, differs ac-
cordingly. For our purposes it is important to note that such cases 
typically do not raise a notice question since, even in a "non-deeds 
out" jurisdiction, the purchaser of the resubdivided lots will have 
constructive notice of the covenants contained in the deed from 0 
to A. Thus, if one can solve the conceptual difficulties attendant 
upon making such covenants enforceable by A's vendees, the ques-
tion of notice simply disappears. 
G. Summary 
With respect to the enforcement of equitable servitudes, we can 
define nvo distinct situations where a court must consider the ques-
tion of notice. First, there is the situation where the common grantor, 
in selling a portion of his land, has inserted in the deed an express 
restriction purporting to burden his retained land, but has failed to 
insert that restriction in subsequent deeds of the retained land. Be-
cause of the equitable nature of such an interest, the courts have 
traditionally refused to enforce the covenant against a subsequent 
91. See, e.g., Silberman v. Uhrlaub, 116 App. Div. 869, 102 N.Y. Supp. 299 (1907). 
92. Neither the traditional contract nor property tp.eories of enforcement arc ade• 
uate to explain how a subsequent purchaser of a lot previously included in a larger 
tract burdened by a restrictive covenant can acquire the benefit of such a restriction 
with respect to any tracts which make up the original servient estate. Using the 
example set forth in the text, we can see how O can enforce against A and B or their 
subgrantees; how A and B can enforce against each other; and even how the sub-
grantees from 11. can sue B or his subgrantees and vice versa. To allow one of B's 
subgrantees to enforce against another, however, requires resort to an almost meta• 
physical analysis. Chafee and Re, for example, suggest that we might "regard the area 
as like a checkerboard with every square bound and benefited as a whole, or • • • 
that each square inch of soil is bound and benefited with respect to every other 
square inch, even though situated inside a single original lot." CHAFEE & RE, CASES 
ON EQUITY 447 (4th ed. 1958). 
93. These cases do not really raise the typical resubdivision problem, although 
they are often treated as if they did. There is no logical reason for treating such a 
situation as any different from other cases where a common grantor (here the common 
grantor is A, not 0) inserts restrictions in deeds to lots in a subdivision. Although 
the deeds from A may incorporate restrictions appearing in his original deed from 
0, O's intent should be irrelevant in transactions between A and his grantees. But 
see Wright v. Pfrimmer, 99 Neb. 447, 156 N.W. 1060 (1916), and Weiser v. Freeman, 
227 Pa. 78, 75 Atl. 1021 (1910), where the courts focused attention on the intent of 
0 rather than the intent of A. 
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purchaser of 'the servient estate who takes without notice of the ex-
istence of the restriction. Such notice may be actual, inquiry, or con-
structive. We have explored the several approaches which have been 
taken by the various courts with respect to the question of construc-
tive notice by virtue of "deeds out," observing that those courts 
which find notice usually emphasize the importance of the interest 
to the owner of the dominant estate, while those refusing to find 
notice emphasize the "burden of title search" problem. 
Second, there are situations where the restrictions on the retained 
land are not expressly imposed by a clause in the deed to grantee Ai 
Under these circumstances grantee A must establish that the land 
subsequently conveyed by the common grantor is burdened by re-
strictions similar to those imposed on his own tract and that Ire, as 
the owner of tract A, is the beneficiary of such restrictions. If he re-
lies on a theory of implied reciprocal negative covenants, he must 
also establish that the subsequent purchaser of tract B had notice of 
the restrictions. This he may do by virtue of the doctrine of inquiry 
notice, by actual notice, or by the doctrine of constructive notice in 
a "deeds out" jurisdiction. In this situation, presumably the func-
tion of the recording system is to give the subsequent purchaser con-
structive notice of the fact which gives rise to the implied covenants 
-the imposition of the restrictions on other "deeds out" by the 
common grantor. 
IV. EASEMENTS 
A. Legal Interests v. Equitable Interests 
In an examination of the effect of the recording laws on ease-
ments (as opposed to equitable servitudes), it is initially important 
to analyze the principles which the courts must apply in deciding 
benveen the claims of the respective grantees. No longer are we deal-
ing with a situation where a court can apply the traditional doctrine 
that an innocent purchaser of a legal interest takes free and clear of 
outstanding equities. Unlike a situation involving equitable servi-
tudes, an easement is a legal interest and as such was not historically 
subject to being defeated by an innocent purchaser for value.94 Al-
though there is authority for the proposition that by virtue of the 
recording acts all legal interests are to be treated as equities, 95 it is 
submitted that there is little judicial -or statutory justification for so 
94. See note 3 supra. 
95. "[A]t common law an innocent purchaser of a legal title took clear of trusts 
and equities, but not of legal conveyances, whether known to him or not; but our 
recording acts, which are designed to make all conveyances matters of record notice, 
put even legal conveyances on the footing of equities." Bird v. Smith, 8 Watts 434, 
441, 34 Am. Dec. 483, 487 (Pa. 1839). 
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sweeping a generalization. As was previously described, it is only 
the unrecorded legal conveyance which is now subject to being de-
feated by subsequent purchasers without notice.96 Thus, under a 
strict interpretation of the typical recording statute,97 it would ap• 
pear that a legal interest is subject to being defeated only if the in-
terest is one required to be recorded, it is in fact not recorded, and 
the contest is bet\veen the owner of the interest and a subsequent 
purchaser without notice. 
From the for~going analysis it can be seen that it is misleading to 
treat a case involving an easement as strictly analogous to a case in-
volving an equitable servitude. In the latter situation it is possible 
to argue that even if the instrument creating the restriction is re• 
corded (as in the typical "deeds out" case), the interest can still be 
defeated by application of rules relating to bona fide purchasers, if 
a court finds that recording under such circumstances does not con-
stitute constructive notice to the subsequent purchaser. If, however, 
the deed to grantee A purports to grant an easement (a legal inter-
est) which burdens the retained land, it would appear to be irrele-
vant whether B had constructive notice of such an easement, as long 
as grantee A records. The distinction thus drawn between restrictive 
covenants and easements has been clearly recognized by a number of 
cases dealing with equitable servitudes,98 and, despite an occasional 
dictum to the contrary, the author has not been able to find any 
easement cases (even in "non-deeds out" jurisdictions) where a 
court has squarely held for the owner of the servient tenement in 
such circumstances. 99 
96. See text accompanying· notes 9-11 supra. 
97. E.g., M1CH. CoMP. LAws § 565.29 (1948), a "race notice" statute: "Every con• 
veyance of real estate within the state hereafter made, which shall not be recorded as 
provided in this chapter, shall be void as against any subsequent purchaser in good 
faith and for a valuable consideration, of the same real estate or any portion thereof, 
whose conveyance shall be first duly recorded." 
98. In rejecting the "deeds out" rule, the court in Glorieux v. Lighthipe, 88 N.J.L. 
199, 203, 96 Atl. 94, 96 (1915) stated: "A purchaser may well be held bound to exam-
ine or neglect at his peril, the record of the conveyances under which he claims, but 
it would impose an intolerable burden to compel him to e.xamine all conveyances 
made by every one in his chain of title. The case differs from the conveyance of an 
easement or any interest that lies in grant. A grant takes effect regardless of notice; 
an equitable servitude is the creature of equity alone and depends entirely on the 
existence of notice." See also Howland v. Andrus, 80 N.J. Eq. 276, 83 Atl, 982 (1912): 
Holt v. Fleischman, 75 App. Div. 593, 600, 78 N.Y. Supp. 647, 652 (1902) (concurring 
opinion); 5 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 1266 (3d ed. 1939). 
99. Despite the clear distinction drawn in Glorieux v. Lighthipe, supra note 98, 
between easements .and equitable servitudes, we see the distinction ignored in the 
dicta of subsequent New Jersey opinions. In National Silk Dyeing Co. v. Grobart, 117 
N.J. Eq. 156, 175 Atl. 91 (1934), the court erroneously cited Glorieux for the propo• 
sition that "a purchaser of other land from a common grantor is not charged with 
notice of an easement granted by an earlier deed not in his chain of title •• , ." Id. 
at 163, 175 Atl. at 94. The court proceeded, however, to find "inquiry" notice by 
virtue -of the fact that the common grantor had conveyed the remaining land to the 
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While it can be argued that it-is anomalous and undesirable that 
the owner of an easement is afforded protection against subsequent 
purchasers where under identical circumstances the owner of an 
equitable servitude is not, it is submitted that the "mutually inno-
cent party" context in which this situation typically arises justifies 
adherence to the traditional distinction. This is especially true when 
one considers the haphazard way in which so many of the equitable 
servitude cases appear to have been decided. It would be ironic if 
the analogy benveen equitable servitudes and easements-so often 
employed to give equitable servitudes a status traditionally enjoyed 
by legal interests-were now used to the detriment of owners of 
easements on the theory that if the equitable servitude is defeated, 
though recorded, an easement should likewise be defeated in similar 
circumstances. 
B. Easements by Implication 
Thus, one must beware of accepting without extensive qualifica-
tions the frequently quoted principle that "a bona fide purchaser of 
land without actual or constructive notice of the existence of an ease-
ment in such land takes title free and clear from the burden of the 
easement."100 Not only must there be excepted from the operation 
of such a rule situations involving express easements; in many juris-
dictions the rule is not even valid for cases involving various- types 
of easements by implication.101 Unless we are to regard such ease-
ments as creatures of equity, and therefore subject to the traditional 
BFP rule,102 it would appear necessary to bring them within the 
defendant, "excepting" the plaintiff's lot. In Camp Clearwater, Inc. v. Plock, 52 N.J. 
Super. 583, 146 A.2d 527 (1958), the dictum of National Silk was elevated to the status 
of a "legal rule": "It is true that in this state the provisions of the recording act • • • 
are deemed not to charge a purchaser of lands with constructive notice of easements 
or covenants affecting his land which appear in an earlier deed by his grantor, con-
veying property other than the property involved in the purchaser's chain of title." 
Id. at 598, 146 A.2d at 536. Again, however, the language is dictum, the case actually 
having been decided on the theory that the easement merged when the common 
grantor re-acquired the dominant estate. Many of the cases that are frequently cited 
as b~aring on the question of the applicability of the "deeds out" rule to easements 
are actually decided on other grounds. See, e.g., Johnston v. Harsh, 207 Ala. 524, 93 
So. 451 (1922) (unrecorded easement); State v. Anderson, 241 Ind. 184, 170 N.E,2d 812 
(1960) (unrecorded easement); Hammond v. Earls, 146 Ky. 162, 142 S.W. 379 (1912) 
(actual notice); Phillips v. Lawler, 259 Mich. 567, 224 N.E. 165 (1932); Missouri Power 
&: Light Co. v. Thomas, 340 Mo. 1022, 102 S.W .2d 564 (1937) (actual notice); Parker v. 
Meredith, 59 S.W. 167 (Tenn. Ct. Ch. App. 1900) (unrecorded easement); Wichita 
Valley Ry. v. Marshall, 37 S.W.2d 765 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931) (negative easement 
treated as contract). 
100. See, e.g., 17A AM. JUR. Easements § 128 (1957). 
IOI. Some authorities distinguish between easements by "necessity" and other types 
of easements by implication. E.g., 3 PoWELL, REAL PROPERTY §§ 410-ll (1952). Others 
treat the easement by necessity as simply one form of a general category of easements 
by implication. See, e.g., REsTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 474 (1944). For an excellent col-
lection of cases, see Annot., 174 A.L.R. 1241 (1948). 
102. But see Ricenbaw v. Kraus, 157 Neb. 723, 61 N.W .2d 350 (1953), where the 
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scope of the recording system in order to make the notice principle 
applicable to them. In fact, the latter proposition has been applied 
in the class of cases involving so-called "quasi-easements," where an 
established use of a part of a single tract for the benefit of another 
part of the same tract is allowed to continue after severance, even 
though the deed is silent with respect to such use.108 The New York 
court was persuaded in such a case that it would be illogical to pro-
tect a Bf P against prior unrecorded deeds and not to afford the 
same protection in the case of "anything less than a deed in fee such 
as an agreement, expressed or implied, creating an easement.''104 
One possible answer to such an argument is to treat the easement as 
being created by the recorded ·writing which conveys the quasi-domi-
nant parcel, the easement being read into the conveyance by inter-
pretation.105 
Several of the courts which have refused to recognize the notice 
principle as relevant in cases of easements by implication have em-
phasized the hardship which recognition of the principle would 
impose on the owner of the dominant estate-the obligation to know 
when the original owner is negotiating for sale of the servient tene-
ment, so as to be able to give notice of the easement by implication 
to the prospective purchaser.106 However, a persuasive counter-
argument would be that the owner of the dominant estate is in a 
better position to protect himself than is the owner of the servient 
estate, since the dominant owner can demand that the easement be 
expressly provided for in his deed.107 Obviously, this discussion 
court gave effect to an oral license of drainage on a theory of "equitable estoppel," 
even though the owner of the servient estate was a subsequent purchaser without 
notice. 
103. See 17A AM. JUR. Easements§ 33 (1957); 3 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY§ 411 (1952). 
104. Goldstein v. Hunter, 257 N.Y. 401, 178 N.E. 675 (1931). See also Tufts v. 
Byrne, 278 App. Div. 783, 103 N.Y.S.2d 917 (1951). In a number of cases, particularly 
those dealing with implied easements of light and air, the courts have tended to 
disregard the distinction between the requirement that the easement be "apparent" (as 
a prerequisite to implication between the original parties) and the requirement of 
notice under the recording systems, which relates to subsequent purchasers of the 
servient estate. See, e.g., Robinson v. Clapp, 65 Conn. 365, 32 Atl. 939 (1895). See also 
Walek v. DiFeo, 60 N.J. Super. 324, 159 A.2d 127 (1960). The result in many such 
cases is probably attributable more to the antagonism of the courts to easements of 
light and air than to a well-reasoned interpretation of the effect of the ·recording 
system. E.g., Roe v. Walsh, 76 Wash. 148, 135 Pac. 1031 (1913). But see McKeon v. 
Brammer, 238 Iowa 1113, 29 N.W.2d 518 (1947). "Whatever be the test with respect 
to apparency of the servitude when the question to be decided is whether there was 
an easement or not, it is clear that no such test should be applied when the existence 
of the easement is admitted or established and the question is whether it will be 
extinguished if not apparent to a purchaser of the servient estate." Id. at 1122, 29 
N.W .2d at 523. 
105. This is the usual theory by which it. is argued that implied easements do not 
violate the Statute of Frauds. See 3 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY § 411 n.3 (1952). 
106. See, e.g., Wiesel v. Smira, 49 R.I. 246, 142 Atl. 148 (1928). 
107. "The simplest rule, and that best suited to a country like ours, in which 
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assumes that an easement so created would itself be effective against 
subsequent purchasers.108 
C. Easements by Prescription and Necessity 
In the case of easements acquired by prescription, of course, 
there is ordinarily no way that the owner of the dominant estate can 
bring himself within the protection of the recording system, and 
there is virtually unanimous agreement that the notice principle 
does not apply to such situations.109 However, a case involving an 
easement by necessity is not so easily resolved.110 If such an easement 
is regarded as arising by operation of law (in order to prevent land 
from remaining unusable), then it should logically be treated as 
analogous to an easement by prescription and hence exempt from 
the operation of the recording system. Conversely, if such an ease-
ment is regarded as arising out of the implied terms of the grant, it 
is more logical to favor the purchaser without notice-at least in 
those jurisdictions which do so in the case of other types of ease-
ments by implication. In practice, however, the divergent case law 
is not attributable to any such dichotomy of analysis, nor does it 
appear to recognize the existence of the recurring theme of this 
paper: that these problems involve a choice between conflicting so-
cial policies and conflicting claims of mutually innocent parties.111 
changes arc continually taking place in the ownership and use of lands, is that no 
right of this character can be acquired without express grant of an interest in, or 
covenant relating to, the land over which the right is claimed." Roe v. Walsh, 76 
Wash. 148, 155, 135 Pac. 1031, 1034 (1913), quoting from Keats v. Hugo, 115 Mass. 204, 15 
Am. Rep. 80 (1874). 
108. See note 99 supra and accompanying text. 
109. "In such a situation there are two innocent parties. On the one hand we 
have the innocent purchaser, in the sense that he purchased the servient estate with-
out notice of an easement that was not apparent. On the other hand we have the 
owner of the dominant estate in full possession of an easement that is not apparent, 
which he has gained by prescription or one which the law will imply upon a severance. 
He has no instrument to record, that will give constructive notice to prospective 
purchasers of the servient estate. . . • Until the easements so created are in some 
manner brought within the recording acts •.• the owner of the dominant estate and 
consequently the owner of the easement is not in default or in any manner estopped 
from asserting his easement right as against any owner of the servient estate." McKeon 
v. Brammer, 238 Iowa 1113, 1120, 1126, 29 N.W.2d 518, 522, 525 (1947), quoting from 
Keats v. Hugo, 115 Mass. 204, 15 Am. Rep. 80 (1874). See also Annot., 174 A.L.R. 
1244-46 (1948). 
110. See generally 3 POWELL, REAL PROPER.TY § 410 (1952). . 
111. In the leading case of Backhausen v. Mayer, 204 Wis. 286, 234 N.W. 904 (1931), 
for instance, the court justified its holding in favor of the subsequent purchaser by 
the theory that the owner of the dominant estate was "negligent" in failing to 
extract an express covenant from his grantor. Some courts have held for the subse-
quent purchaser of the servient estate on the basis of a general policy against implied 
grants of interests in land, including easements by necessity. E.g., Howley v. McCabe, 
117 Conn. 558, 169 Atl. 192 (1933). Others have gone to great lengths in order to find 
the notice they apparently assume is necessary. See, e.g., Keen v. Paragan Jewel Coal 
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V. CONCLUSION 
In situations involving equitable servitudes, we have seen the 
confusion generated by the attempt to apply the notice principle to 
differing fact patterns and divergent theories of enforcement. Often 
it is a defect in the recording system which causes the difficulty. In 
the case of easements, the situation is similar and makes generaliza-
tion equally difficult. In the case of easements created by express 
grant, as was the case with express restrictive covenants, one can de-
plore the fact that a flaw (essentially mechanical) in the recording 
system has prevented the subsequent purchaser from ascertaining 
that he is purchasing a servient estate. Because of the historical limi-
tations on the BFP rule as it relates to easements, the owner of the 
dominant estate will probably fare better than he would in an anal-
ogous situation involving equitable servitudes,112 but this makes it 
no less imperative that the recording system be overhauled so as to 
protect the owners of both the dominant and servient estates.118 
In the case of easements created by means other than express 
grant, the problem is similar to that presented by the implied re-
strictive covenant; there are divergent and often conflicting theories 
to explain how such interests can be created, and the applicability 
of the notice principle to such a situation differs accordingly. One 
must understand the policies reflected in the "easement by neces-
sity" or "easement by prescription" doctrines before the recording 
system, or indeed the notice principle, can be intelligently evaluated 
in such a context. One might conclude, for example, that public 
policy requires the protection of an easement by necessity, regard-
less of whether the recording system can give the owner of the ser-
vient estate notice that such an interest exists.114 In short, the situa-
tions we have been considering demonstrate that accurate functional 
generalization is not always possible. Does a "deed out" give notice 
of easements .or covenants affecting the servient estate? The best an-
swer, alas, is that it depends . . . . 
Co., 203 Va. 175, 122 S.E. 543 (1961), where the court held that the owner of the 
servient estate was charged with notice from the recorded title that defendant's land 
was surrounded on all sides by the lands of strangers. See also Annot,, 41 A.L.R. 1442 
(1926). 
112. See note 98 supra and accompanying text. 
II3. The same arguments, pro and con, that applied to the suggested solutions to 
the notice problem in the area of express restrictive covenants would appear equally 
applicable to the easement situation. See notes 59, 70, 73-75 supra and accompanying 
text. 
114. The argument in support of such a conclusion would be that 'the interest of 
society in preserving the usability of land is more important than the objective of 
protecting subsequent purchasers. 
